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capacity of uninterdicted arcs crossing between subsets is minimized. The multi-
commodity network-interdiction model (MCNIM) explicitly minimizes the maximum 
amount of flow that can potentially be moved among node groups using K single-
commodity flow models connected by joint capacity constraints. It is a min-max model 
but is converted into an equivalent integer program MCNIM-IP. 
Both MPNIM and MCNIM-IP are tested using four artificially constructed 
networks with up to 126 nodes, 333 arcs, K=5, and 20 interdictions allowed. Using a 333 
MHz Pentium II personal computer, maximum solution times are 563.1 seconds for 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The study of network interdiction considers the problem of allocating firepower 
or other means to lessen the warflghting capabilities of an enemy through interdictions of 
his transportation and/or communications networks. 
One well-studied interdiction problem, the "maximum-flow network-interdiction 
problem" (MFNIP), minimizes the maximum source-to-sink flow through a capacitated 
network by interdicting (attacking) network arcs with limited interdiction resources. This 
thesis investigates a generalization of MFNIP, the "K-group maximum-flow network-
interdiction problem" (KNIP), and develops two models to solve or approximately solve 
this problem. 
In this chapter, we provide background on network interdiction, introduce KNIP, 
and briefly explain the proposed models. 
A. OVERVIEW 
In MFNIP, a "network user" (enemy, adversary) attempts to maximize the amount 
of flow from a source node to a sink node in a capacitated network G while an 
"interdictor," using limited resources, strives to minimize this maximum flow by 
interdicting (breaking or stopping flow on) network arcs. Steinrauf (1991) and Wood 
(1993) use mathematical-programming methods to solve MFNIP. They develop a min-
max formulation of MFNIP, the "maximum-flow network-interdiction model" (MFNIM), 
and then convert that into an integer-programming model (MFNIM-IP). 
MFNIP is reasonable for situations in which flow moves from one or more source 
nodes to one or more sink nodes. The model assumes that (a) the interdictor has complete 
information about source and sink nodes in the network and (b) no node in the network 
1 
acts as a source and sink node simultaneously. Thus, MFNIP is sensible for simple 
scenarios, for instance, where the enemy must move materiel, equipment, or troops 
through a transportation network from one or more rear staging points (source nodes) up 
to one or more battlefield locations (sink nodes). 
Not all wartime scenarios are so simple, however. For instance, an enemy may 
have K "regional forces" scattered around a theater of war and interconnected by a 
communications network G with known topology and linlc capacities. The interdictor 
would like to use limited interdiction resources to attack this network and minimize his 
adversary's inter-group communications capabilities. 
We cannot use MFNIM to model the above problem. We assume G to be 
undirected and call this new problem the "K-group maximum-flow network-interdiction 
problem" (KNIP). In KNIP, the network user tries to maximize the amount of flowinG 
among three or more "special node groups," e.g., different regional forces, each 
represented as a group of nodes; the interdictor uses limited resources to attack and 
minimize that maximum flow. As the interdictor, the assumption that the adversary will 
maximize flow among the special node groups allows us to minimize the worst-case 
functionality (for us) of the enemy's system. This provides an upper bound on the true 
quantity of materiel or message traffic that will be moved through the network, and this is 
probably the best we can do without knowing the value or purpose of particular flows. 
KNIP may arise in situations where the interdictor has a rough idea about the 
locations of the enemy's force groups (or supply points, demand points, etc.,) but is 
unsure of exactly how much, and between which force groups, materiel or messages will 
be transferred. To solve KNIP, we develop two models, namely the "multi-partition 
2 
network-interdiction model" (MPNIM) and the "multi-commodity network-interdiction 
model" (MCNIM). In both MCNIM and MPNIM, we assume that (a) the network 
G=(N ,A) is capacitated and undirected and (b) K disjoint "special node groups" N; , ... , N~ 
are prespecified where each N; represents a set of source and/or sink nodes. 
Furthermore, UN; << INI is assumed, although this assumption does not materially 
k 
affect any of the solution techniques. 
MCNIM is a direct model for KNIP, i.e., it explicitly minimizes the maximum 
amount of flow that can be moved among the node groups N; , ... , N~ . MCNIM models 
the potential movement of enemy supplies or messages using K single-commodity 
maximum-flow models connected by joint capacity constraints: For each k', N;. is 
treated as a set of source nodes and UN; is treated as a set of sink nodes. The 
k~k' 
interdictor destroys arcs to minimize the maximum amount of flow that can be moved in 
this K-commodity model. 
MCNIM is a complicated model that may be difficult to solve. Therefore, we first 
describe and solve a smaller approximating model MPNIM. MPNIM partitions the node 
set N into K subsets N1 , ••• , N K, with N; c N1 , ••• , N~ c N K , and interdicts certain arcs 
connecting the subsets Nk while observing constraints on interdiction resources. The 
objective is to minimize the total capacity of the uninterdicted arcs crossing between the 
various subsets. 
MPNIM is simpler than MCNIM and may be easier to solve. Furthermore, we 
show that it can be modified to completely isolate K node groups, if desired. However, 
3 
MPNIM is an approximating model because (a) it does not explicitly minimize flow 
among the node groups and (b) it does not enforce the sensible requirement that the nodes 
in each identified subset be contiguous. 
KNIP is equivalent to MFNIP when the number of disjoint node groups K=2 and 
the network G=(N ,A) is undirected. Thus, MFNIP may be regarded as a special case of 
KNIP. 
B. LITERATURE SEARCH 
Several network-interdiction problems have been studied in the literature, but · 
most research has dealt with MFNIP. MFNIP was originally motivated by efforts to 
destroy enemy supply lines during the Vietnam War. The problem has been studied by 
Wollmer (1964, 1970), Durbin (1966), McMasters and Mustin (1970), Helmbold (1971), 
Ghare, Montgomery, and Turner (1971), Lubore, Ratliff, and Sicilia (1971, 1975), 
Steinrauf (1991), and Wood (1993). MFNIM, which is a starting point for this thesis, 
. appears in the last two works. Cormican ( 1995) shows how to solve MFNIM using 
Benders decomposition and Cormican, Morton and Wood (1995) solve a stochastic 
version of MFNIM with uncertainty in interdiction successes and/or arc capacities. 
Another category of network-interdiction models is also well-studied, namely 
"maximizing the shortest path" (MXSP). In MXSP, a network user wishes to traverse a 
shortest path from a specified node s to a specified node t in a directed (or undirected) 
network G=(N ,A) whose arc lengths C;j 2': 0 are known. An interdictor attempts to 
interdict (destroy or lengthen) arcs, using limited interdiction assets, to maximize the 
length of all shortest-paths. Contributors in this area are Fulkerson and Harding (1977), 
4 
Golden (1978), Israeli (1999), Israeli and Wood (1999) and Wevley (1999). (Wevley's 
model is actually a variant on MXSP.) 
Steinrauf (1991) studies a network-interdiction model that isolates a node or a set 
of nodes in a drug-interdiction scenario. His model destroys arcs to isolate the maximum 
number of nodes around a "central node" in an attempt to maximize the chance of 
isolating a drug-supply node that is believed to lie near the central node. The model 
identifies a set of arcs to interdict and the set of isolated nodes. 
Reed (1994) devises an integer-programming model to maximize the longest path 
in a PERT network through interdiction. The PERT network represents significant tasks 
or "activities" of a project together with precedence relations between activities and the 
nominal time required to complete each activity. Interdictions lengthen the time required 
to complete activities and can therefore be used to delay project completion. Reed 
constructs an interdiction model to delay the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Wollmer (1970) and Washburn and Wood (1994) develop game-theoretic 
network-interdiction models. However, the purpose of these models is quite different 
than those mentioned above. In particular, these authors try to determine optimal arc-
inspection strategies to detect an evader moving through a network secretly. These 
models are not related to this thesis. 
C. OUTLINE OF THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II gives essential 
definitions and notation together with a detailed background on MFNIM. In Chapters III 
and IV, we develop MPNIM and MCNIM, respectively. We give the computational 
5 
results regarding both models in these chapters. Chapter V provides conclusions and 
recommendations for further research. 
6 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
In this chapter, we give essential definitions and notation together with a detailed 
derivation of MFNIM. Most definitions follow Wood (1993) and Ahuja, Magnanti, and 
Orlin (1993). 
Although KNIP is defined on an undirected network, much of the related theory is 
based on directed networks. Therefore, we use those networks as a starting point and 
discuss undirected networks later. 
A. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION 
G=(N,A) denotes a directed network with node set Nand arc set A. An arc is an 
ordered pair CiJJ with i, j e N , and i * j. For an arc (iJ), i is the "tail node" from which 
the arc originates, and j is the "head node" at which the arc terminates. An arc (iJ) is 
"incident from i'' and "incident to j." FS(i) (forward star of node i) represents the set of 
arcs incident from node i and RS(i) (reverse star of node i) represents the set of arcs 
incident to node i. 
In this thesis, we assume a single type of interdiction resource. R total units of 
resource are available to the interdictor, and 'ii units of resource are required to interdict 
arc (i,JJ. The rii may be assumed to be small, positive integers. 
B. NETWORK MAXIMUM-FLOW MODELS 
1. Standard Maximum-Flow Model 
In MFNIM, the network user is assumed to solve a maximum-flow model after 
observing the effects of interdictions. · In this section, we define the "standard" 
maximum-flow model (MFM) (e.g., Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin 1993, p. 168) that 
7 
determines the maximum quantity of a single commodity that can be moved through a 
capacitated network from a source node s to a sink node t. 
We consider a capacitated, directed network G=(N,A) with a nonnegative capacity 
uij < oo associated with each arc (i,j)e A . Let U = 1!-l:axuij. To define the "maximum-
<•.,)EA 
flow problem," we distinguish two special nodes in G, a "source node" s and a "sink 
node" t, t '# s . Maximizing flow from s to t is the same as maximizing flow along an 
extra "return arc" (t,s) added to G. 
Maximum-Flow Model (MFM) 
Indices: 
i,je N nodes in an directed network G = (N,A). Includes two special nodes, 
the source s and the sink t 
(i,j)e A directed arcs in the network G = (N,A) 
Data: 





amount of flow on arc (i,J) 





(j ,i)ERS (i) 





L ytj - LYjt + Yts =0 :ar (3) 
(t,j)eFS(t) (j,i)RS(t) 
V(i,j)e A (4) 
The quantity y ij is the flow of the commodity from node i to node j on directed 
arc (i, j) e A, and Yts is the flow from sink node t to source nodes on the artificial return 
arc (t,s). The "flow-balance constraints" (1), (2) and (3) require that the flow arriving at a 
node equal the flow leaving the node. Capacity constraints (4) require that flow on each 
arc be non-negative and not exceed the arc's capacity. 
2. Simplified Maximum-Flow Model 
An equivalent and simpler formulation of the maximum-flow model can be 
obtained if flow entering the sink node t or flow leav}ng the source node s is maximized. 
This formulation, which will simplify our later models, is: 





s.t. L Yij- LYj; =0 Vie N-s-t (6) 
(i,j)eFS(i) (j,i)eRS(i) 
Yis =0 V(i,s)e RS(s) (7) 
V(t,j)e FS(t) (8) 
\1 (i,j)e A (9) 
The objective (5) is to maximize flow entering the sink node t, although it can be 
replaced by max LY;r which maximizes flow leaving the source node s. Constraints 
y (j,i)eRS(t) 
(6) are the standard flow-balance constraints for nodes other than sand t. Constraints (7) 
9 
and (8) set the flow on arcs that terminate at sand leave t to zero, respectively. Capacity 
constraints (9) are as before. 
3. Cuts and the Dual of the Maximum-Flow Model 
A "cut" (Ns, N1 ) is a partition of the node set N into two subsets Ns and N, such 
that s E Ns and t E N1 • Each cut defines a set of arcs that have one endpoint in Ns and 
the other endpoint in N1. With respect to that cut, an arc (i, j) is a "forward arc" if i E Ns 
and jE N1 ; otherwise it is "backward arc." The "capacity of a cut" (Ns,N1 ) is 
I,uii , i.e., the capacity of the cut is the sum of arc capacities for the forward arcs 
(i,j)eAjieN, ,jeN1 
crossing the cut. A "minimum cut" is a cut whose capacity is minimum among all 
possible cuts in the network. 
By the well-known maximum-flow minimum-cut theorem (Ford and Fulkerson 
1956), the maximum flow equals the capacity of a minimum cut. A minimum cut can be 
found directly by solving the dual of the maximum-flow problem DMFM (e.g., Wood 
1993). DMFM, which we will show next, is important for formulating MFNIM-IP. 
The dual variables of the maximum-flow model, a; and Bii, have already been 
indicated in MFM. When we fmd an optimal solution to the maximum-flow problem, we 
also find an optimal solution to the minimum-cut problem through those dual variables. 




nodes in an directed network G = (N,A). Includes two special nodes, 
the source s and the sink t 
directed arcs in the network G = (N, A) 
10 
Data: 
nominal capacity of arc (i,;) 
Decision Variables: 
dual variables associated with flow-balance constraints (1), (2) and (3) 
fromMFM 




s.t. \;;/ (i, j) E A (10) 
~1 (11) 
\;;/ (i, j) e A 
In fact, the dual variables in DMFM may be assumed to be binary (e.g., Wood 
1993). Let (Ns,N,) correspond to a minimum cut in G=(N,A) and let a; =1 for 
\;;/ i e N, a; = 0 for \;;/ i e Ns, 8ii = 1 for all arcs (i, j) which are forward arcs in the cut, 
and 8 ii = 0 for all other arcs. Constraint (11) is obviously satisfied by the assignment of 
the variables. We can also see that constraints ( 1 0) are satisfied by checking against the 
fourclassesofarcs (i,j): (a) ieNs,jeNs, (b) ieNs,jEN1 , (c) ieN1,jENs, and 
(d) i e N 1 , j e· N, . Thus, the above solution is feasible. Furthermore, because the 
objective function of DMFM equals the capacity of the minimum cut (N s, N 1 ), it follows 
11 
from maximum-flow minimum-cut theorem and linear-programming duality that the 
solution is optimal. Wood (1993) uses this result to convert MFNIM into MFNIM-IP. 
4. Undirected Networks 
G=(N ,A) may also denote an undirected network. Undirected networks are 
important to us because (a) many real-world networks such as road and 
telecommunications networks are essentially undirected, (b) KNIP will be defined on 
undirected networks and (c) although MFNIM was originally defined for directed 
networks, Wood (1993) shows how to extend it to undirected networks. 
An undirected network is defined in the same manner as a directed network 
except that arcs are unordered pairs of distinct nodes. In an undirected network, we can 
refer to an arc joining the node pair i andj as either (i,j) or (j,l). The arc (i,J} is said to be 
"incident to" both nodes i and j. A(l) denotes the set of arcs incident to node i. 
Flow on an undirected arc (i,J} can move from ito j, which will be represented by 
yij, or it can move from j to i, which will be represented by y ji. The total flow (i.e., 
from node ito node j plus from node j to node z} on an undirected arc (i,J} has an upper 
bound uij. That is, the maximum-flow model for an undirected network G has capacity 
constraints yij + y ji ~ uij 'V (i, j) e A. So, a maximum-flow model for an undirected 
network G=(N,A.) is: 
12 
Maximum-Flow Model for an Undirected Network 
max Yrs 
y 
s.t. L ysj- LYjs-Yrs=O 
j:(s,j)EAu(j,s)eA j:(s,j)EAu(j,s)eA 
I yij LYji =0 'VieN-s-t 
j:(i,j)EAu(j,i)eA j:(i,j)EAu(j,i)eA 
L Ytj- LYjs- Yrs =0 
j:(t,j)EAu(j,t)eA j:(t,j)EAu(j,t)eA 
'V (i,j)e A 
'V (i,j) E A 
The above model is equivalent to a maximum-flow model on a directed network 
G+ = (N,A +) where A+ denotes the set of anti-parallel directed arcs derived from the set 
of undirected arcs A so that lA +I = 2IAI. 
In an s-t maximum-flow model for an undirected network G, adding simple upper 
bounds yij ~ uij and y ii ~ uij instead of capacity constraints yij + y ii ~ uij, suffices 
because there always exists an optimal flow with yij = 0 or y ii = 0 (e.g., Ahuja, 
Magnanti, and Orlin 1993, p. 39). In MCNIM, extensions of the constraints 
yij + y ii ~ uij will be required; simple upper bounds will not suffice. 
C. MAXIMUM-FLOW NETWORK-INTERDICTION 
1. Maximum-Flow Network-Interdiction Model 
MFNIP can be formalized in a min-max flow-based model. The network user 
attempts to maximize the flow across the network, while the interdictor simultaneously 
strives to minimize this maximum flow. The network interdictor's activities are limited 
13 
by a resource constraint. We call the resulting model the "maximum-flow network-
interdiction model" (MFNIM). 
Maximum-Flow Network-Interdiction Model <MFNIM) 
Indices: 
i,je N nodes in an directed network G = (N,A). Includes two special nodes, 
the source s and the sink t 
(i,j)e A directed arcs in the network G = (N,A) 
Data: 
nominal capacity of arc (i,J) 
interdiction resource required to interdict (break) arc {iJ) 
R total interdiction resource 
Decision Variables: 
Network User's Decision Variables: 
amount of flow on arc (i,J) 
Interdictor's Decision Variables: 
1 if arc {iJ) is interdicted; 0 otherwise 
Formulation: 
minmax y 
xeX y ts (12) 
s.t. L Ysj- LYjs- Yts =0 (13) 
(s,j)eFS(s) (j,s)eRS(s) 
L yij - LYji =0 'Vie N-{s,t} (14) 
(i,j)eFS(i) (j,i)eRS(i) 
14 
where X ={xe {0,1}1AI: Lriixii ~R} 
(i,j)eA 




The objective (12) is to minimize the maximum flow. Constraints (13), (14) and 
(15) are just flow-balance constraints from :MFM. The capacity constraints (16) restrict 
the amount of flow on each arc to the arc's nominal capacity if the arc is not interdicted, 
or to zero if the arc is interdicted. Constraint (17) limits the expenditure of interdiction 
resource. 
2. An Equivalent Integer Program 
For a fixed interdiction decision, note that the inner maximization of the MFNIM 
is just a maximum-flow model. Wood (1993) takes the dual of the inner maximum-flow 
model and linearizes the resulting non-linear objective function to obtain an equivalent 
(linear) integer program. We refer to new model as "MFNIM-IP" and describe it next. 
Maximum-Flow Network-Interdiction As An Integer Program (MFNIM-IP) 
Indices: 
i,je N nodes in an directed network G = (N,A). Includes two special nodes, 
the source s and the sink t 
(i,j)e A directed arcs in the network G = (N,A) 
Data: 
nominal capacity of arc (i,J) 
interdiction resource required to interdict (break) arc CiJ) 
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1 if arc {iJ) is interdicted; 0 otherwise 
for some cut (Ns,N,), 1 if ie Ns; 0 if ie N, 
1 if arc (i,J) is a forward arc of the cut (Ns,N,)and is not interdicted; 
0 otherwise 
~1 
l:rijxij :c:;; R 
(i,j)eA 
a; e {0,1} 
'V (i,j)e A 
"i/ (i, j) e A 
'Vie N 
Note that this model resembles DMFM but with Bij replaced by Pij + xij. 
MFNIM identifies a cut where the variables a; have the same meaning as in the DMFM. 
xij and Pij represent interdiction decisions and can be explained as follows: For a 
forward arc (i,J) crossing the cut, a; -aj =-1 so pij +xij =1 is required. So, either 
xij = 1, indicating that this arc is interdicted, or pij = 1, indicating that this arc is not 
interdicted and forms part of the minimum cut after interdiction. xij = pij = 0 indicates 
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that ate {iJ) is neither interdicted nor part of the (identified) minimum cut after 
interdiction. 
D. AN EQUIVALENT FORMULATION OF :MFNIM 
The original derivation ofMFNIM-IP from MFNIM is complicated (Wood 1993). 
However, a simpler derivation is possible. This derivation will be useful later and is 
provided for reference, next. 
We know that the objective function (12) of MFNIM is a concave function in 
the xii and so it is clear that MFNIM is a difficult, non-convex minimization problem 
even if the xii are continuous. The problem, however, can be "convexified" by moving 
the variables xii into the objective of the inner maximization (Cormican, Morton and 
Wood 1998). In the following, we give this formulation and explain why this technique 
works. We call the new model the "convexified maximum-flow network-interdiction 
model" (MFNI.Mc). 






L Ysj- LYjs- Yts =0 
(s,j)EFS(s) (j,s)ERS(s) 














where X= {xe {O,l}IAI : :Lriixij ~ R}. 
(i,j)EA 
MFNIM and MFNIMc are essentially equivalent because the inner maximization 
in MFNIMc is essentially equivalent to the inner maximization in MFNIM. The inner 
objective in MFNIMc maximizes the maximum flow through the network less flow on 
interdicted arcs. Because the value of a unit of flow on an arc in a maximum-flow 
problem is at most one, there can be no benefit to the interdictor of having flow on 
interdicted arcs. Therefore, if xij = 1, we may assume that, as in MFNIM, y ij = 0 . (It is 
possible in MFNIMc that y ij > 0 even if xij = 0, but in this case there always exists an 
alternative optimal solution with yii = 0 .) 
MFNIMc allows us to obtain MFNIM-IP directly. To do this, fix the integer 
variables xij, take the dual of the inner maximization and then release the xij. 
Building on the material discussed in this chapter, we introduce MPNIM in 
Chapter ill and MCNIM in Chapter N, respectively. 
18 
ill. MULTI-PARTITION NETWORK-INTERDICTON MODEL 
In this chapter, we present the "multi-partition network-interdiction model" 
(MPNIM) that solves KNIP approximately. 
A. OVERVIEW 
Recall from Chapter I that MFNIM cannot be used to solve KNIP. However, we 
can use some of the ideas behind MFNIM to solve KNIP approximately. 
MFNIM is based on the maximum-flow minimum-cut theorem (Ford and 
Fulkerson, 1956). Wood (1993) shows that MFNIM identifies a cut and breaks certain 
arcs in that cut so as to minimize remaining cut capacity. In other words, MFNIM 
partitions the node set N into two subsets N s and N, , with N s containing a specified 
source node s (or source nodes) and N, containing a specified sink node t (or sink 
nodes), and interdicts arcs that cross between these subsets, so that the flow between the 
subsets N s and N, is minimized. We use this node-partitioning idea to develop 
MPNIM. 
We assume that the network G=(N ,A) is undirected and that K disjoint "special 
node subsets" N; , ... , N~ are prespecified; each N; represents a set of source and/or sink 
nodes whose identities can be obtained through intelligence reports. Instead of trying to 
minimize the flow among the N; , ... , N~ directly (which results in MCNIM), MPNIM 
will partition N into K disjoint subsets Np···· N K, with N; c Np···· N~ c N K, and 
interdict certain arcs connecting the subsets Nk while observing constraints on interdiction 
resources. The objective is to minimize the total capacity of the uninterdicted arcs 
crossing between the subsets N k • 
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This model is appealing because (a) we expect there to be a strong correlation 
between the minimized "total inter-subset capacity" and actual flow, (b) the optimal 
objective value of MPNIM clearly provides an upper bound on inter-subset flows, i.e., on 
the optimal solution to KNIP, and (c) the model reduces to MFNIM when K=2. 
We next give the formulation for MPNIM and explain the formulation in detail. 
We then extend the formulation to isolate the special node groups completely. 
B. INTERDICTION MODEL :MPNIM 
MPNIM can be formulated as follows: 
Multi-Partition Network-Interdiction Model (MPNIM) 
Indices: 
i,je N 




nodes in an undirected network G=(N,A) 
undirected arcs in the network G=(N ,A) 
nodes that are preassigned to node subset N k, k = 1, ... , K. 
nominal capacity of arc CiJ) 
interdiction resource required to interdict (break) arc (iJ) 
total interdiction resource 
Decision Variables: 
if arc CiJ) crosses between two different subsets and is interdicted; 
0 otherwise 
1 if node i is assigned to N k ; 0 otherwise 
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s.t. ie N (24) 
k =I, ... ,K, (i,j)e A (25) 
k=I, ... ,K, (i,j)e A (26) 
~I (i,j)e A (27) 
I~~~R ~~ 
(i,j)eA 
aike{O,l} k=I, ... ,K,ieN 
k = I, ... ,K,ie N; (29) 
(30) 
The objective (23) is to minimize the sum of the capacities on uninterdicted arcs 
crossing between different node subsets. Constraints (24) require each node ito belong 
to exactly one subset Nk. Constraints (25) and (26) enforce a partitioning of the nodes 
and determine whether an arc crosses between two subsets: 
Pii=O. xii =I and/or Pii =I are also feasible to constraints (25) and (26) in 
this case, but we may assume that both variables are 0 because (a) Pii = 0 
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contributes less to the objective function than does f3ii = 1, and (b) xii = 0 
consumes less resource than does xii = 1. (Alternate optimal solutions with 
xii = 1 are possible if there is excess resource.) 
2. If i e Nk and j e Nk', k ::t: k', then xii + f3ii = 1 is required to maintain 
feasibility. So, either xii = 1, indicating that arc (i,JJ is interdicted or f3ii = 1, 
indicating that this arc is not interdicted and contributes to the inter-subset 
capacity after interdiction. 
MPNIM classifies the arcs in the network into three groups: (a) Arcs that cross 
between subsets and are interdicted, (b) arcs that cross between subsets and are not 
interdicted, and (c) arcs that do not cross between subsets. Constraints (27) together with 
(25) and (26) ensure that each arc is in one of these three groups. Constraint (28) 
ensures that total interdiction resource consumed does not exceed total resource available. 
More complicated resource constraints involving the xii are certainly possible and do not 
materially affect the model. Constraints (29) set aile = 1 if node i is preassigned to node 
subset Nk, i.e., i e N;, and constraints (30) set aile. = 0 to zero if i e N; and k ::t: k'. 
MPNIM is an approximation of MFNIM for two reasons. First, the model does 
not explicitly minimize flow among the special node groups N;. Second, MPNIM does 
not enforce a sensible requirement that the nodes in each identified subset be contiguous. 
However, the solution to the proposed model may be a reasonable approximation and 
should provide insight into a model that explicitly minimizes inter-subset flows. 
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C. EXTENDING MPNIM TO ISOLATE NODE GROUPS 
We can extend MPNIM to isolate K special node groups completely. The simplest 
way to do this is (a) fix all Pij = 0, and (b) change the objective to min L'ijxij, i.e., to 
(i,j) eA 
minimize total interdiction resource consumption. 
D. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
We have tested MPNIM using four artificially constructed networks assuming 
that rij =1 for all arcs (i,j). Test networks are n 1 xn2 grid networks as shown in Figure 1, 
where n1 is the number of nodes in the horizontal axis and n2 is the number of nodes in 
the vertical axis. The arc capacities Uij are randomly drawn from the discrete uniform 
distribution on [13,99]. The model is formulated in GAMS (Brooke, Kendrick, Meeraus 
and Raman 1997) and run on a 333 MHz Pentium IT PC using the solvers CPLEX 6.5 and 
XA (GAMS Development Corporation 1997). Solution times for MPNIM are mostly 
better using XA; however, we present CPLEX's results because solution times for 
MCNIM-IP, which is harder to solve than MPNIM, are better using CPLEX. We use a 
relative optimality criterion (OptCR) of 1%. That is, the solver stops when the integrality 
gap CIBP-B~) / (1 + IBPj) < OptCR where BF is the objective function value of the 
cui-rent best integer solution and BP is the best possible integer solution (GAMS 
Development Corporation 1997). Table 1 gives model statistics and run times for several 
values of R and K for each of the four networks. Figure 1 displays one of the solutions. 
It is not hard to find (by hand) a feasible multi-commodity flow in Figure 1 in 
which all non-interdicted, inter-subset arcs are capacitated. Thus, this interdiction plan is 
optimal for MCNIM-IP as well as for MPNIM. 
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Network nl n2 INI IAI Total Number of Optimal Run Time 
G = (N,A) Resource R Subsets K Obj. Value (seconds) 
1 7 4 28 63 9 3 16 1.6 
11 3 0 1.8 
6 4 334 1.7 
11 4 144 1.8 
2 10 6 60 149 10 3 321 4.2 
11 4 427 20.3 
16 4 222 18.2 
25 4 0 25.6 
3 14 7 98 263 11 3 234 4.2 
20 3 0 39.5 
16 4 313 6.4 
20 4 149 5.9 
4 14 9 126 333 11 4 863 189.2 
20 4 426 160.9 
11 5 1414 518.5 
20 5 924 563.1 
Table I. Model statistics and run Urnes for MPNIM usmg a relative optimality critenon of 1%. Several 
different values of R and K are used with four different networks. For instance, the problem for Network 2, 
which has 60 nodes and 149 arcs, when R=10 and K=3 is solved in 4.2 seconds with an optimal objective 
value of321. 
We have also tested MPNIM to isolate Knode groups completely, extending the 
model as described in Section C. We use the same test networks, computer, solver and 
optimality criterion. Table 2 gives model statistics and run times for different values of K 
for each of the networks. Note that the optimal objective value is the amount of the 
interdiction resource required to isolate the node groups. 
Network nl n2 INI IAI Number of Optimal Run times 
G=(N,A) Subsets K Obj. Value (seconds) 
I 7 4 28 63 3 10 1.5 
4 18 2.1 
2 10 6 60 149 3 20 2.8 
4 23 10.6 
3 14 7 98 263 3 19 3.6 
4 26 3.7 
4 14 9 126 333 4 34 186.5 
5 46 484.4 
Table 2. Model statistics and run Urnes for MPNIM when used to Isolate Knode groups completely. A 
relative optimality criterion of I% is used. Several different values of K are used with four different 
networks. For instance, the problem for Network 2 when K=3 is solved in 2.8 seconds with an optimal 
objective value of 20. The optimal objective value is actually the amount of interdiction resource needed to 






Subset N1 Subset N2 
1 
Subset N3 
Arcs that cross between two subsets and are interdicted. (There are 10 of these arcs.) 
Arcs that cross between two subsets and are not interdicted. (There are 11 of these arcs.) 
Arcs that do not cross between subsets and are in a subset. (There are 128 of these arcs.) 
Figure 1. Solution of MPNIM for Network 2 when R=lO, K=3 and rij = 1 V (i, j) e A. Numbers 
next to arcs are capacities. Each shade of darkened node indicates a different subset N; . The 
optimal objective value is 321. 
THIS PAGE HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
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IV. MULTI-COMMODITY NETWORK-INTERDICTION MODEL 
In Chapter ill, we developed MPNIM to solve KNIP approximately. In this 
chapter, we derive two models to solve KNIP exactly. These models are the "multi-
commodity network-interdiction model" (MCNIM) and an equivalent formulation of 
MCNIM, the "convexified multi-commodity network-interdiction model" (MCNIMc). 
Through MCNIMc, we also obtain an equivalent integer program for MCNIM, denoted 
"MCNIM-IP." 
A. OVERVIEW 
We assume that our adversary will try to maximize flow among K disjoint and 
prespecified node groups N;, ... ,N~ in a capacitated, undirected network G=(N,A.). We 
model this using K single-commodity maximum-flow models connected by joint capacity 
constraints. (This is actually a multi-commodity maximum-flow model.) Each single-
commodity maximum-flow model indexed by k treats nodes in N; as source nodes and 
·nodes in UN;. as sink nodes; the adversary's objective is to maximize the sum of all 
k'*-k 
single-commodity flows. 
Having modeled the enemy's activities, the interdictor's problem is to minimize 
the maximum amount of flow among the N; using limited interdiction resources. As in 
MFNIM, this interdiction problem can be modeled using two different min-max flow-
based formulations: (a) The basic formulation, MCNIM, sets the capacity of an arc to 
zero if interdicted and (b) the convexified version of the basic formulation, MCNIMc, 
subtracts flow on interdicted arcs from the standard maximum-flow objective. 
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Our assumption that the adversary will maximize flow allows us to model the 
worst-case functionality (for the interdictor) of the adversary's system. The purpose of 
the adversary is really to move the "right amount of commodities" between the "right 
node groups." By minimizing maximum flow, we minimize an upper bound on the true 
amount of commodities, measured in common units, that can be transferred. This is the 
best we can do without additional information on the value of flows in the network. 
For modeling purposes, we define N' =UN; to be "special nodes" and 
k 
N- N' to be "non-special nodes." Our formulations assume that all special nodes can be 
both source and sink nodes; however, the formulations can easily be adapted to situations 
in which some special nodes are only source or only sink nodes. 
We now explain MCNIM, MCNIMc and MCNIM-IP in detail. 
B. INTERDICTION MODELS 
MCNIM is first described. It is a straightforward extension of MFNIM. 






nodes in an undirected network G = (N,A) 
qndirected arcs in the network G = (N,A) 
subset of "special nodes," k =1, .. . ,K. 
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Data: 
nominal capacity of arc (i, j) 
interdiction resource required to interdict (break) arc (i, j) 
R total interdiction resource 
Decision Variables: 
Network User's Decision Variables: 
yiik amount of flow on arc (i, j) whose source is in N; 
Interdictor's Decision Variables: 
1 if arc (i, j) is interdicted; 0 otherwise 
Formulation: 
min max 
xeX y :Lc :L Yijk + LYiik) k (i,j)eA:ieNI: (i,j)eA:jeNI: (31) 
k = 1, ... , K, i e N- N' (32) 
2/Yiik + Yiik) Suii(1-xii) (i,j)e A (33) 
k 
where X= {xe {O,l}IAI: L'iixii S R}. 
(i,j)EA 
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k = 1, ... ,K, (i,j)e A 
k = 1, ... ,K, ie N' -N;, (i,j)e A (34) 
k=1, ... ,K, je N'-N;, (i,j)e A (35) 
k=1, ... ,K, jeN;,(i,j)eA (36) 
k = 1, ... , K, i e N;, (i, j) e A (31) 
The objective (31) is to minimize the maximum flow among the subsets N; . The 
arc capacity constraints (33) restrict the amount of flow on each arc to the arc's nominal 
capacity if the arc is not interdicted, or to zero if the arc is interdicted. 
For x = 0, the inner maximization is simply the "multi-commodity maximum-
flow model" (MCMFM). MCMFM models the enemy's potential transfers of materiel 
among the subsets N; using K single-commodity flow models linked by joint capacity 
constraints. In MCMFM, for each subset N; there is a single-commodity maximum-
flow model in which nodes in N; are treated as sources and nodes in UN;. are treated 
k'#c 
as sinks. Each single-commodity flow model is formulated using the approach of 
SMFM: Instead of defining a super-source connected to N; and a super-sink connected 
to N'- N; and maximizing flow on a return arc, the amount of flow leaving N; is 
maximized; see the objective (31). Flow-balance constraints (32) are given only for non-
special nodes; flows originating at sink nodes are fixed to 0 by (34) and (35), and flows 
entering source nodes are fixed to 0 by (36) and (37). 
Like MFNIM, MCNIM is a difficult, non-convex minimization problem: In 
particular, the optimal solution to the inner maximization is a concave function of x. 
However, the model can be convexified by moving the variables xii into the objective of 
the inner maximization as we did in the derivation of MFNIMc. We do this next. 
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s.t .. L Yiik- LYiik =0 k = 1, ... , K, i E N- N' : aik (39) (i,j)eA+ (j,i)eA+ 
_L(yiik + Yiik) ~ uii (i,j)e A : pij (40) 
k 
y ijk ;;:::: 0, y jik ;;:::: 0 k = 1, ... ,K, (i,j)e A 
Yiik =0 k = 1, ... ,K, i eN' -N;, (i,j)e A (41) 
Yiik = 0 k = 1, ... , K, j e N'- N; , ( i, j) e A (42) 
Yiik =0 k = 1, ... , K, j e N;, (i, j) e A (43) 
Yiik =0 k = 1, ... , K, i e N;, (i, j) e A (44) 
where X= {xe {0,1}1AI: Lriixii ~ R}. The aik and pii are dual variables for constraints 
(i,j)EA 
(39) and (40), respectively, given fixed x. 
The objective (38) is to minimize the total maximum flow less the flow on 
interdicted arcs. The inner objective in (38) is to maximize the maximum flow through 
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the network less flow on interdicted arcs. This is equivalent to maximizing flow with 
L (y ijk + y jik) ~ uij (1- xij) 'V (i, j) E A as in the inner maximization of MCNIM 
k 
because: As in the single-commodity model, 1 is an upper bound on the dual variable pij 
associated with the joint capacity constraints for arc {iJ) when xij = 1. This establishes 
that MCNIM and MCNIMc are essentially equivalent. Constraints (39) and (41) through 
(44) are as in MCNIM. Constraints (40) require that the .total flow on an arc (i,J) not 
exceed that arc's capacity. 
C. AN EQUIVALENT INTEGER PROGRAM 
MCNIMc can be converted into a simple minimization model by fixing x 
temporarily, taking the dual of the inner maximization and then releasing x: 





As in MCNIM, plus 
8 ijk 1 if i E N; ; 0 otherwise 
Decision Variables: 
xij 1 if arc (i, j) is interdicted; 0 otherwise 
aik dual variables associated with flow-balance constraints (39) 





k = 1, ... ,K, (i,j)e A 
k = 1, ... ,K, (i, j) e A 
{i,j)e A 





The objective function ( 45) derives from the dual objective of MCMFM just as 
the objective of MFNIM derives from the dual of the standard maximum-flow model. 
However, we cannot guarantee that the aik or the Pij here will be binary as they are in 
MFNIM; thus, there is no simple interpretation of this objective in terms of cut capacity 
as there is for the objective of MFNIM. Constraints (46) and (47) account for the arcs 
that (a) start at a non-special node and end at a sink node, (b) start at a source node and 
end at non-special node, (c) start at a non-special node and end at non-special node, and 
(d) start at a source node and end at sink node. Constraint ( 48) is the interdiction 
resource constraint, as usual. 
D. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
We have tested MCNIM-IP using the test networks, computer, solver and 
optimality criterion that were used to test MPNIM. Table 3 gives model statistics and run 
times for the same values of Rand K as in Table 1. We find optimal solutions to 10 out 
of 16 problems in a reasonable amount of time (at most 3,600 seconds). MCNIM-IP's 
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solution to the problem in Figure 1 is identical in x to the solution provided by MPNIM 
and objective values are equal. This must be true because we identify a feasible solution 
to MCNIM from the solution to MPNIM, and all arcs crossing the MPNIM partition are 
saturated in that solution. 
fu the solution just mentioned, all Pii = 0 or I. Those Pii that are I correspond to 
the saturated, inter-subset arcs. Figure 2 shows one solution in which not all the pij are 
binary. 
Total Initial Optimal Run 
Network ni n2 INI IAI Resource Number of Integrality Objective Times G=(N,A) R SubsetsK gap(%) Value (sec) 
1 7 4 28 63 9 3 4.4 16.0 4.4 
11 3 100.0 0.0 2.9 
6 4 24.9 322.5 2.5 
11 4 63.9 144.0 2.6 
2 10 6 60 149 10 3 39.8 321.0 6.3 
11 4 59.7 420.0 656.0 
16 4 90.2 221.0 408.0 
25 4 100.0 0.0 24.6 
3 14 7 98 263 11 3 52.6 234.0 19.4 
20 3 100.0 0.0 39.3 
16 4 80.4 [313-2.4%] 3600.0 
20 4 100.0 [149-3.7%] 3600.0 
4 14 9 126 333 11 4 44.5 [791-23.7%] 3600.0 
20 4 87.4 [476-75%] 3600.0 
11 5 35.1 [1102-25.9%] 3600.0 
20 5 64.4 [846-77%] 3600.0 
.. Table 3. Model statJ.stJ.cs and run times for MCNIM-IP usmg a relative optJ.mahty cntenon of 1%. Several 
different values of R and K are used with four different networks. For instance, the problem for Network 3, 
which has 98 nodes and 263 arcs, when R=11 and K=3 is solved in 19.4 seconds with an optimal objective 
value of 234. The initial integrality gap for this problem is 52.6%. "[ ]" indicates that the problem could 
not be solved in less than 3,600 seconds with 1% OptCR. For those problems, the resulting objective value 
and OptCR at the end of 3,600 seconds are given in [ ]. For example, the problem for Network 3 when 
R=16 and K=4 has an objective value of313 and an OptCR of2.4% at the end of3,600 seconds. 
E. COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
Table 4 compares solution statistics for MPNIM and MCNIM-IP. "By theorem," we 
know that z~PNIM ~z~CNIM-IP• and the statistic IOO%xZ~NIM/Z~CNJM.IP allows for a 
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simple comparison of the two optimal objective values when both models can be solved. 
Unfortunately, MCNIM-IP can only be solved for 10 of the 16 problems. Of the 10 
problems that are solved by both models, 7 have essentially identical solutions, and the 
largest difference is 3.6%. It appears that, at least for the problems solved by both 
models, there is a strong correlation between optimal objective values. The solution 
provided by MPNIM may be, in fact, a more-than-adequate approximation to the solution 
to MCNIM-IP, especially because MPNIM appears to be much easier to solve. 
Network nl n2 INI IAI R K MPNIM MCNIM-IP 100%xZ~~ 
G=(N,~ Run Run Z~CNIM-IP z• times z• times 
(sec) (sec) 
1 7 4 28 63 9 3 16 1.6 16.0 4.4 100.0% 
11 3 0 1.8 0.0 2.9 100.0% 
6 4 334 1.7 322.5 2.5 103.6% 
11 4 144 1.8 144.0 2.6 100.0% 
2 10 6 60 149 10 3 321 4.2 321.0 6.3 100.0% 
11 4 427 20.3 420.0 656.0 101.7% 
16 4 222 18.2 221.0 408.0 100.5% 
25 4 0 25.6 0.0 24.6 100.0% 
3 14 7 98 263 11 3 234 4.2 234.0 19.4 100.0% 
20 3 0 39.5 0.0 39.3 100.0% 
16 4 313 6.4 [313-2.4%] 3600.0 -
20 4 149 5.9 [149-3.7%] 3600.0 -
4 14 9 126 333 11 4 863 189.2 [791-23.7%] 3600.0 -
20 4 426 160.9 [476-75%] 3600.0 -
11 5 1414 518.5 [1102-25.9%] 3600.0 
-
20 5 924 563.1 [846-77%] 3600.0 
-
.. Table 4. Model statistics and run times for MCNIM-IP and MPNIM usmg a relative optimality cntenon 
of 1%. The problem for Network 2 when R=11 and K=4 is solved in 20.3 seconds with an objective value 
of 427 using MPNIM and in 656 seconds with an objective value of 420 using MCNIM-IP. The solutions 
differ by 1.7%. "[ ]" indicates that the model could not be solved in 3,600 seconds, and shows the best 








Arcs that are interdicted, i.e., xii = 1. (There are 11 of these arcs.) 
Arcs that are not interdicted and have pij = 1. (There are 9 of these arcs.) 
Arcs that are not interdicted and have pij = 0.5. (There are 10 of these arcs.) 
Arcs that are not interdicted and have pij = 0. (There are 119 of these arcs.) 
Figure 2. Solution of MCNIM-IP to Network 2 when R=11, K=4 and r;j = 1 't/ (i, j) e A. This solution has 
some fractional values for Pii. Numbers next to arcs are capacities. The optimal objective value is 420. 
Each shade of darkened node indicates a different subset N;. By linear programming duality, arcs with 
pij > 0 must be capacitated in the primal, post-interdiction flow model. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis has studied the K-group maximum-flow network-interdiction problem 
(KNIP) which is a generalization of the maximum-flow network-interdiction problem 
(MFNIP). In KNIP, a network user attempts to maximize flow among prespecifi.ed, 
disjoint "special node groups", N;, N~ , ... , N~, K ~ 3, while an interdictor interdicts 
(destroys, stops flow on) network arcs, using limited interdiction resources, to minimize 
this maximum flow. We have developed two models, namely the multi-partition 
network-interdiction model (MPNIM) and the multi-commodity network-interdiction 
model (MCNIM) to solve KNIP, and showed how MPNIM can be modified to 
completely isolate the special node groups. 
MPNIM is an approximating model that partitions the node set N into subsets 
N1 , ••• , N K, with N; c N1 , ••• , N~ c N K, and interdicts certain arcs connecting the subsets 
Nk while observing constraints on interdiction resources. The objective is to minimize 
the total capacity of the uninterdicted arcs crossing between the various subsets. 
MCNIM is an exact model that explicitly minimizes the maximum amount of 
flow that can potentially be moved among the node groups using K single-commodity 
flow models connected by joint capacity constraints. Viewed as a minimization, MCNIM 
is a difficult, non-convex problem. So we derive an equivalent convexifi.ed formulation, 
MCNIMc. Through MCNIMc, an equivalent integer program, MCNIM-IP, is obtained 
and solved. 
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We have tested MPNIM and MCNIM-IP using four artificially constructed test 
networks ranging in size from 28 nodes and 63 arcs to 126 nodes and 333 arcs. All 
computation was performed on a 333 MHz Pentium II computer using the CPLEX 
Version 6.5 solver. MPNIM, when used to isolate node groups, solves 8 problems (two 
values of K are used for each network) in less than 484.4 seconds each. When used to 
solve KNIP, MPNIM solves all 16 problems (two values of K and two resource levels for 
each network), each in less than 563.1 seconds. MCNIM-IP can only solve 10 of the 
problems given a limit of 3,600 CPU seconds. The optimal objective for MPNIM, 
z~NIM' is an upper bound on the optimal objective for MCNIM-IP, z~CNIM-IP· For the 
10 problems solved by both models, Z~NIM does not exceed Z~CNIM-IP by more than 
3.6%, so MPNIM may be an adequate approximation and replacement for MCNIM in 
many situations. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Further research on MCNIM and MPNIM is needed to improve solution times, 
enable solution of large problems, and broaden their scope of applications. To enable 
solution of large problems and shorten run times, solving MCNIMc by Benders 
decomposition can be tried. Cormican (1995) shows that Benders decomposition tends to 
work better than solving the integer program for MFNIP directly. To improve solvability 
(i.e., to enable solution of large problems and shorten run times) of both MPNIM and 
MCNIM, integer-programming cuts for both MPNIM and MCNIM-IP can be devised. 
Wood (1993) shows how such cuts can be beneficial in solving one maximum-flow 
interdiction model. 
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This thesis has ignored issues of uncertainty in the models, but uncertainty in 
intelligence reports and in interdiction success might be important. The models should be 
extended to handle uncertain interdiction successes and uncertain arc capacities as in 
Cormican, Morton and Wood (1996). 
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